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REGULATING BALANCE BILLING IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR: SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE?

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine thinking you are dying. You are paralyzed on your bedroom floor because of a heart attack. Luckily, your neighbor finds you
and takes you to the nearest hospital. You survive. You have insurance, so you should not be too worried about the medical bill, right?
But after a successful surgery, you receive a medical bill for a whopping $108,951.1 This scenario is not just a hypothetical. Sadly, it is not
unique either. A man named Drew Calver lived this experience.2 He
survived his traumatic heart attack, but at what cost? The neighbor
that saved Calver’s life could have potentially put Calver in a life of
debt. The hospital to which Calver’s neighbor brought him was out-ofnetwork for Calver’s insurance.3 Therefore, his insurance only covered $55,840 out of the exorbitant bill totaling $164,941.4 Luckily for
Calver, after National Public Radio (NPR) caught wind of his story
and reported on it, the hospital lowered Calver’s bill to a more reasonable $331.5 However, most individuals facing a similar experience are
not as fortunate. They do not have a journalist pressuring the hospital
to lower their bill. This is the horror of balance billing.
This Comment analyzes whether the current federal solution to
combat balance billing, the No Surprises Act (H.R. 3630), is sufficient
or whether the federal government must continue to reevaluate its
recent proposals in order to provide for a more comprehensive plan to
limit the effects of balance billing on the American people. Part II of
this Comment explores the scope of balance billing and the various
situations in which this practice traditionally occurs.6 Next, this Comment explains the limited ways the federal government has addressed
balance billing in terms of Medicaid and Medicare as well as several
state solutions developed to combat the issue of balance billing in the
1. Libby Watson, The Grim Lottery of Surprise Medical Bill Stories, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct.
10, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/155334/grim-lottery-surprise-medical-bill-stories.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II.A.
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private sector.7 Part II also delves into the four factors that result in
comprehensive balance billing regulation.8 Part III provides an analysis of the three major balance billing proposals in Congress9 in terms
of both the four comprehensive factors and the factors solely applicable to federal balance billing regulation.10 Lastly, Part IV discusses the
impact of these regulations and the constitutional issues that may arise
from enacting balance billing regulation at the federal level.11
Ultimately, although some states have enacted more extensive balance billing laws and issues will inevitably arise from the federal government’s attempt at regulating balance billing in the private sphere,
the federal government made the correct decision by adopting the No
Surprises Act because it is a more comprehensive solution to balance
billing.
II. BACKGROUND
The “practice of balance billing refers to a physician’s ability to bill
a patient for an outstanding balance after the insurance company submits its portion of the bill.”12 This type of billing occurs with both
private and public insurance, yet the federal government has traditionally only regulated balance billing in the public sphere, when patients utilize Medicaid or Medicare.13 As a result, many states have
taken it upon themselves to enact laws to address balance billing in
the private sector.14 However, not all states’ balance billing regulations meet the four factors that constitute comprehensive regulations.15 There are also several areas that state laws cannot regulate.16
The federal government’s intervention in regulating balance billing in
the private insurance market is thus necessary. Various federal balance billing proposals and recently enacted legislation attempt to com7. See infra Part II.B–C.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. At the time of this writing, the three major balance billing regulations in Congress were the
Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act of 2020, H.R. 5826, 116th Cong.
(2020); the Ban Surprise Billing Act of 2020, H.R. 5800, 116th Cong. (2020); and the No Surprises Act of the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, PUB. L. NO. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182,
2756 (2022).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. Brooke Murphy, 20 Things to Know About Balance Billing, BECKER’S HEALTHCARE (Feb.
17, 2016), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/20-things-to-know-about-balancebilling.html.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. Id.
16. See infra Part II.D.
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bat the issues surrounding balance billing, each of which uses a slightly
different approach.17 However, since Congress ultimately adopted
only one bill, each proposal must be evaluated to determine whether
the recently enacted legislation is the best option for regulating balance billing.
A. Scope of Balance Billing
Balance billing occurs when a physician bills a patient for the remaining balance on a medical bill after the patient’s insurance company has already paid the physician its portion of the bill.18 This type
of billing is also referred to as “surprise medical billing” because patients do not expect to receive a bill directly from the treating hospital
because they believe their insurance covered the entire cost of care.19
However, the patients may not have realized that the care they received was not in-network coverage, or the patients may have thought
their insurer was going to contribute more money for a service than
the insurer actually did.20
Balance billing typically occurs in two situations.21 First, a provider
may bill a patient when a patient receives emergency medical care
from an out-of-network healthcare provider (as was the case for Drew
Calver).22 A federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), prevents hospitals operating under Medicare
from turning away patients who need emergency medical attention
simply because the patients may not have insurance or because the
treating hospital may not be in the patient’s insurance network.23
Other times, the hospital may be in-network, but a patient’s insurer
does not cover the costs associated with emergency room doctors and
staff who treat the patient.24 Obviously, when such a facility or provider uses its resources to treat a patient with an emergency medical
condition, the treating entity wants to get paid. However, since most
insurance companies often refuse to pay the costs of out-of-network
17. See infra Part II.E.
18. Murphy, supra note 12.
19. Jaime Rosenberg, 5 Things About Surprise Medical Billing, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Sept.
6, 2016), https://www.ajmc.com/view/5-things-about-surprise-medical-billing.
20. Murphy, supra note 12.
21. PAUL D. CLEMENT, FEDERAL “BALANCE BILLING” LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 6 (2019), https://www.scribd.com/document/414001118/
Paul-Clement-Balance-Billing-Constitutional-Implications-June-2019.
22. Id.; Watson, supra note 1.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2011).
24. Murphy, supra note 12.
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emergency care, hospitals are forced to bill the patients for the balance that their insurer refuses to provide.25
Second, balance billing frequently occurs when a patient receives
care at an in-network facility, but the care comes from an out-of-network provider.26 For instance, a patient may choose a hospital for surgery because it is within his insurer’s network.27 But if, for example,
the anesthesiologist or radiologist that treats the patient chooses not
to participate in that network,28 the patient’s insurance provider will
likely not cover the services performed by the out-of-network physicians.29 The patient, however, is completely unaware of the provider’s
relationship to his insurance company and that, as a result, his insurance will not cover portions of the bill.30 This situation commonly occurs when a patient requires air ambulance services.31 When
circumstances necessitate such ambulatory services, patients usually
do not have the time or physical capability to select an air ambulance,
much less choose an air ambulance that their insurance plan may
cover.32 In this situation, insurance companies will not cover the cost
of air ambulance services if they are out-of-network, and such services
tend to be quite expensive, having an out-of-pocket cost of roughly
$24,500 per trip.33 As a result, in order to recoup some of the costs of
care, providers will then attempt to leave the patient with the bill.34
Receiving an expensive bill for services from an out-of-network provider working at an in-network hospital is especially unnerving for patients who carefully planned to receive treatment at an in-network
facility yet inadvertently end up paying a higher cost.35 However,
some laws exist to alleviate the significant financial burden that balance billing places on patients.36
25. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 6.
26. Id.
27. Murphy, supra note 12.
28. Id.
29. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 6.
30. Murphy, supra note 12.
31. Id.
32. Joan Stephenson, Solutions for Air Ambulance Surprise Billing in Holding Pattern, JAMA
(Mar. 4, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2762706.
33. Ethan Kispert, FAIR Health Report Shows 76.4% Increase for In-Network Air Ambulance
Costs, ST. REFORM (Oct. 4, 2021), https://stateofreform.com/featured/2021/10/fair-health-reportshows-76-4-increase-for-in-network-air-ambulance-costs.
34. Stephenson, supra note 32.
35. Ike Brannon & David Kemp, The Potential Pitfalls of Combating Surprise Billing, 42
CATO INST. REG., Fall 2019, at 40, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2019-10/regulationv42n3-1-updated.pdf.
36. Id.
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B. The Federal Government’s Limited Regulation of
Balance Billing
Before the enactment of the No Surprises Act, the federal government enacted some limited regulations to prevent balance billing in
government-funded healthcare programs.37 However, these federal
regulations were limited in scope to services reimbursed by Medicaid
and Medicare and failed to cover any commercial insurance products
or employer health plans.38 For instance, Section 1396a(n)(3)(A) of
the Social Security Act explicitly states that the amount of money paid
under a state healthcare plan, such as Medicaid, “shall be considered
to be payment in full for the service.”39 Also, the beneficiary “shall
not have any legal liability to make payment to a provider or to an
organization . . . .”40 Therefore, with regard to Medicaid, providers
cannot balance bill beneficiaries “if the providers have already billed
and accepted payment from Medicaid.”41
Similarly, under Medicare, participating providers cannot balance
bill beneficiaries because these providers agreed to accept Medicare’s
approved payment amounts as full payment for the services rendered
to the beneficiary.42 Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(C) explicitly states that when a person is entitled to medical assistance under a
state plan, the provider “furnishing the service may not seek to collect
from the individual . . . payment of an amount for that service.”43
However, nonparticipating providers can balance bill, but they can
only do so in a limited capacity.44 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395w4(a)(2)(D)(3), nonparticipating providers’ “payment[s] shall be based
on 95 percent of the payment basis for such services furnished by a
participating” provider.45 Nonparticipating providers can then bill
Medicare beneficiaries a “limiting charge,” meaning that they cannot
charge the beneficiaries more than fifteen percent of what Medicare
would pay to the provider.46
37. WEN SHEN, BALANCE BILLING: CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND PROPOSED FEDERAL
SOLUTIONS, CONG. RES. RES. 2 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/LSB10284.pdf.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(n)(3)(A) (2020).
40. Id. at § 1396(n)(3)(B).
41. SHEN, supra note 37, at 2.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(C).
44. MEDICARE RESOURCES CTR., What Is Balance Billing?, https://www.medicareresources.
org/glossary/balance-billing/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(2)(D)(3) (2020).
46. MEDICARE RESOURCES CTR., supra note 44.
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When it comes to Medicare and Medicaid, as exhibited by the several statutes in place, the federal government aims to eliminate balance billing in its entirety or reduce its reach,47 and it imposes
sanctions on those who violate balance billing statutes.48 However, until the enactment of the No Surprises Act, there were no federal laws
to address balance billing in the context of private insurance.49 As a
result, state governments took it upon themselves to develop balance
billing regulations to protect their residents who obtain healthcare
coverage from the private insurance market.50
C. State Solutions to Balance Billing Issues in the Private
Insurance Market
As of February 5, 2021, thirty-three states offer some form of regulation in order to protect their residents against balance billing in the
private insurance market.51 However, while the majority of states
have laws to combat balance billing, certain states have more comprehensive balance billing solutions than others.52 The Commonwealth
Fund, a respected private foundation developed to achieve better access and improved quality and efficiency in the healthcare system for
society’s most vulnerable, established four factors to evaluate whether
state balance billing regulations meet the standards for comprehensive
protection.53 To be considered “comprehensive,” the regulations
should (1) “[e]xtend protections to both emergency department and
in-network hospital settings,” (2) apply to all types of insurance, including both Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), (3) protect consumers both by
holding them harmless from extra provider charges and prohibiting
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-w4(a)(2)-(3), 1396a(n)(3)(A)–(B).
48. Memorandum, Melanie Bella, Dir., Medicare-Medicaid Coordination Office, Cindy
Mann, Dir., CMCS, on Billing for Services Provided to Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries
(QMBs) 2 (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib-01-0612.pdf.
49. SHEN, supra note 37, at 2.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Maanasa Kona, State Balance-Billing Protections, COMMONWEALTH FUND fig.1 (Feb. 5,
2021), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/maps-and-interactives/2021/feb/statebalance-billing-protections.
52. See id.; JACK HOADLEY & KEVIN LUCIA, UNEXPECTED CHARGES: WHAT STATES ARE
DOING ABOUT BALANCE BILLING, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND. 13 (2009), https://www.chcf.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PDF-UnexpectedChargesStatesAndBalanceBilling.pdf.
53. COMMONWEALTH FUND, About Us, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/about-us (last
visited Mar. 21, 2021); Jack Hoadley et al., State Efforts to Protect Consumers Against Balance
Billing, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/
state-efforts-protect-consumers-balance-billing. [hereinafter Hoadley et al., State Efforts to Protect Consumers].
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providers from balance billing, and (4) adopt an adequate payment
standard or a dispute resolution process to resolve payment disputes
between providers and insurers.54 At the time of this writing, fifteen
states have enacted comprehensive balance billing regulations that
satisfy all four of the Commonwealth Fund factors.55
However, it must be noted that labeling regulations as “comprehensive” does not necessarily imply that patients receive “total protection” from balance billing.56 But, when considering the factors
together, they protect patients in most emergency department and innetwork hospital settings.57
1. Factor One: Protection in Both Emergency and In-Network
Hopsital Settings
The first factor for evaluating whether a balance billing regulation is
comprehensive - protecting patients from balance billing in both
emergency situations and in-network hospital visits - is paramount. In
2017, eighteen percent of emergency visits and sixteen percent of inpatient hospital stays resulted in a surprise bill.58 Illinois has one of
the most comprehensive balance billing regulations, especially in
terms of satisfying factor one.59 The Illinois Balance Billing Law enacted in 2011 reads as follows:
When a beneficiary . . . utilizes a participating network hospital or a
participating network ambulatory surgery center and, due to any
reason, in network services for radiology, anesthesiology, pathology,
[or] emergency physician . . . are unavailable and are provided by a
nonparticipating facility-based physician or provider, the insurer . . .
shall ensure that the beneficiary . . . shall incur no greater out-ofpocket costs than the beneficiary . . . would have incurred with a
participating physician or provider for covered services.60

Therefore, Illinois balance billing regulations cover both services
performed by emergency room physicians as well as services that may
54. Jack Hoadley, Professor, Geo. U., State Approaches to Protecting Consumers from Surprise Medical Bills, Address Before the House Comm. on Educ. on Lab. 3–4 (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-0402%20HELP%20Hearing%20Hoadley%20Testimony.pdf.
55. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS SECRETARY’S REPORT ON: ADDRESSING
SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLING 13 (2020), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//196341/Surprise-Medical-Billing.pdf. The states are: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Id.
56. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 3–4.
57. Id.
58. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 55, at 6.
59. Id. at 13 n.36.
60. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.3a(b) (2011).
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be performed by other out-of-network providers at an in-network facility.61 However, despite its comprehensive reach, the Illinois Balance
Billing Law still fails to protect patients who are taken to emergency
departments at non-network hospitals.62 The wide reach of the Illinois
statute nevertheless illustrates that states with comprehensive balance
billing regulations still protect patients more than states with lesser
regulations.63
2. Factor Two: Protection of Beneficiaries of All Types of
Insurance Plans
Next, state regulations satisfy the second requirement for comprehensive balance billing protections if the regulations contemplate beneficiaries of all types of insurance plans.64 However, in some states,
the balance billing protections offered depend on whether a beneficiary has a PPO or HMO insurance plan.65 Unlike PPO plans, HMOs
require patients to get a referral from their primary care physician
before seeking out other healthcare services.66 For instance, in Colorado, the balance billing laws protect both HMO and PPO beneficiaries in the same way, meaning that neither beneficiary will be
penalized for failing to pay a balance bill.67 In contrast, Texas’s balance billing laws offer greater protection to beneficiaries with HMO
insurance plans.68 For example, HMO beneficiaries are not liable for
refusing to pay a balance bill in Texas.69 On the other hand, insurers
must only disclose to PPO beneficiaries the possibility that they will
receive balance bills.70 Therefore, the only protection afforded to
these PPO beneficiaries in Texas is notice.71 Similarly, Maryland only
protects PPO beneficiaries from balance billing when their care involves on-call physicians and hospital-based physicians.72
61. Id.
62. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3–4.
65. Hoadley et al., State Efforts to Protect Consumers, supra note 53.
66. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD MICH., What’s the Difference Between HMO and PPO Plans?,
https://www.bcbsm.com/index/health-insurance-help/faqs/topics/how-health-insurance-works/difference-hmo-ppo.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
67. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 7.
68. KEVIN LUCIA ET AL., BALANCE BILLING BY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS: ASSESSING CONPROTECTIONS ACROSS STATES, COMMONWEALTH FUND 4 (2017), https://
SUMER
www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/
___media_files_publications_issue_brief_2017_jun_lucia_balance_billing_ib.pdf.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 4.
71. See id.
72. Hoadley et al., State Efforts to Protect Consumers, supra note 53, at n.(e).
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3. Factor Three: Protection by Holding Patients Harmless and
Prohibting Providers from Sending Balance Bills
The third factor in determining whether a balance billing regulation
is comprehensive, the “hold harmless” standard, also varies from state
to state.73 The most comprehensive hold harmless provisions protect
patients by not holding them responsible for extra provider charges
while also prohibiting providers from balance billing in the first
place.74 California, for example, protects patients in both aspects.75
On the other end of the spectrum, some states, like Colorado, only
stipulate that patients do not have to pay balance bills, but the laws do
not prevent providers from sending them.76 However, since patients
must be held harmless, managed care organizations must resolve the
bill before a provider can pursue action against the beneficiary,
thereby precluding balance bills.77 Nevertheless, receiving unexpected
bills can still confuse patients who are unfamiliar with state regulations that prevent them from having to pay the bill.78
Moreover, an additional consideration pertaining to the third factor
is that some states do not protect patients from balance bills in the
context of nonemergency settings if the patient provided his prior
written consent to obtain services from an out-of-network provider.
For instance, in New Mexico, balance billing regulations do not protect a patient if the patient gives “specific consent for that nonparticipating provider to render the particular services rendered.”79
4. Factor Four: Protection through an Adequate Payment Standard
or Dispute Resolution Process
Having regulations that (1) “extend protections to both emergency
department and in-network hospital settings,” (2) apply to all types of
insurance, and (3) protect consumers both by holding them harmless
from extra provider charges and prohibiting providers from balance
billing is important in determining whether balance billing regulations
73. Id.
74. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 55.
75. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5.
76. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 7.
77. Id.
78. Leah Selby Gray, An Elegant Solution to Network Inadequacy: How to Better Protect Patients from Inadequate Health Networks and Surprise Balance Billing, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1639,
1658 (2019).
79. Surprise Billing Protection Act of 2019, S.B. 337, 54th Leg., 1st Sess., 2019 N.M. Laws ch.
227; Jack Hoadley et al., States Are Taking New Steps to Protect Consumers from Balance Billing,
But Federal Action Is Necessary to Fill Gaps, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 31, 2019), https://
doi.org/10.26099/jfne-dp10 [Hoadley et al., State Are Taking New Steps].
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are comprehensive.80 However, the final and fourth factor, a clear
state-defined reimbursement plan or dispute resolution process, encompasses “the path to a satisfactory solution.”81 When a patient receives healthcare services from an in-network provider, the provider
and the patient’s insurer have a contract, so the insurers pay the providers based on their contract.82 With out-of-network providers, however, no contract exists and providers and insurance companies may
frequently disagree over the payment.83 Therefore, having a payment
standard or dispute resolution process helps providers resolve billing
issues without involving the patient. Furthermore, with a well-defined
reimbursement standard or dispute resolution process, neither the
provider nor insurer has excessive leverage over the other in
negotiations.84
i. Enactment of a Payment Standard
To combat the reimbursement issue between out-of-network providers and insurance companies, some states have adopted a benchmark payment standard, meaning that the state provides a formula
that the insurance company is required to apply when calculating the
payment owed to an out-of-network provider.85 With payment standards, there is no room for negotiation, so the provider must accept
the amount.86 However, there is no consensus amongst the states that
have adopted a payment standard as to how payments should be calculated.87 For instance, some states like California structure the payment standard as a percentage of Medicare rates.88 In 2016, California
passed a balance billing regulation which mandates insurance companies to pay out-of-network providers either “the greater of the average contracted rate or 125 percent of the amount that Medicare
reimburses.”89 In theory, this approach should decrease providers’
bargaining leverage and disincentivize providers from staying out-of80. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 3–4.
81. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 10.
82. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Jack Hoadley et al., Criteria for Meeting Standards, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 18,
2019),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/Criteria_for_Meeting_Standards_v2.pdf [Hoadley et al., Criteria for Meeting Standards].
86. See id.
87. LUCIA ET AL., supra note 68, at 4.
88. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5.
89. Gray, supra note 78, at 1656 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.31(a)(1)
(West 2019)).
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network.90 Many states also choose to use the Medicare fee schedule
as their base since the value scale utilized by Medicare is relatively
well-accepted and does not change based on the type or location of
the physician performing the services.91 In fact, America’s Health Insurance Plans found that, as of July 2019, California saw an average
sixteen percent increase in in-network providers in California commercial networks after the implementation of its payment standard in
2017.92 On the other hand, states like Florida calculate their payment
standard by viewing the “usual and customary provider charges for
similar services in the community where the services were provided.”93 However, this is problematic because providers and insurers
often dispute the standards used to determine usual and customary
fees.94 Therefore, while different approaches exist to determine the
payment standard, the benchmark standard provides the most consistent calculation and helps prevent payment disputes between providers and insurers.
ii. Enactment of Dispute Resolution
On the other hand, states that opt for a dispute resolution process
often require binding arbitration between the insurer and provider to
determine the amount owed to the provider in balance billing cases.95
New York, for example, through its independent dispute resolution
(IDR) process enacted in 2014, requires insurers and healthcare providers to make their best offer, and then an independent arbiter decides which amount is the most reasonable.96 This style of arbitration
is referred to as “baseball-style” arbitration because it works the same
way as Major League Baseball negotiations: the arbiter must ultimately pick one of the proposals rather than independently calculate
the value of the claim.97 Because the independent arbiter will inevitably have to choose one of the proposals, this approach encourages the
insurers and healthcare providers to meet in the middle with regard to
90. Loren Adler et al., California Saw Reduction in Out-of-Network Care from Affected Specialties After 2017 Surprise Billing Law, BROOKINGS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-healthpolicy/2019/09/26/california-saw-reduction-in-out-of-network-care-from-affected-specialties-after-2017-surprise-billing-law/.
91. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 10.
92. Adler et al. supra note 90.
93. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 10.
94. Id.
95. Hoadley et al., Criteria for Meeting Standards, supra note 85.
96. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 55, at 23.
97. Brannon & Kemp, supra note 35, at 43.
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the price.98 Furthermore, the arbiter must consider certain factors
when choosing a proposal, such as the fees paid by the healthcare plan
to reimburse similarly qualified physicians for the same services in the
same region, as well as the training, experience, and usual charge of
the provider.99 In New York, the disputed price must exceed $683.22
in order to trigger the dispute resolution process.100 Between 2015 and
2018, New York reported that the balance billing regulations enacted
in the state saved patients over $400,000,000 in emergency room service charges.101 Such arbitration decisions in New York have not been
shown to favor either the provider or insurer. In 2018, there were 561
disputes settled in favor of the healthcare provider and 618 disputes
decided in favor of the insurer.102
Overall, California and New York’s regulations exemplify the most
comprehensive approaches to regulating balance billing practices.
However, no matter how comprehensive state plans are, there are a
few areas of balance billing that state law is barred from reforming.103
D. Areas in Which State Balance Billing Regulation Is Off-limits
First, federal law prohibits states from protecting patients against
balance bills that result from air ambulance services.104 This is because
the federal Airline Deregulation Act (Airline Act) prevents states
from enacting regulations involving certain aspects of air carriers.105
For example, the Airline Act states that “a State . . . may not enact . . .
a regulation . . . related to a price, route, or service, of an air carrier
that may provide air transportation.”106 A study performed by the
United States Government Accountability Office found that, in both
2012 and 2017, about two-thirds of the air ambulance transports for
privately-insured patients were out-of-network.107 Moreover, the bal98. Id.
99. SABRINA CORLETTE & OLIVIA HOPPE, NEW YORK’S 2014 LAW TO PROTECT CONSUMERS
FROM SURPRISE OUT-OF-NETWORK BILLS MOSTLY WORKING AS INTENDED, ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON FOUND. 5 (2019), https://chirblog.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Georgetown_State
Based-NY-Billing_May2019.pdf.
100. Brannon & Kemp, supra note 35, at 44.
101. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 55, at 23.
102. CORLETTE & HOPPE, supra note 99, at 8.
103. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5.; LUCIA ET AL., supra note 68, at 2.
104. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5.
105. Sabrina Corlette & Maanasa Kona, Lawmakers Had a Chance to Provide Relief from
Surprise Medical Bills – and Whiffed It, GEO. U. CTR. ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS (Sept. 27,
2018), http://chirblog.org/lawmakers-blow-chance-to-curb-surprise-medical-billing/.
106. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
107. . See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AIR AMBULANCE: AVAILABLE DATA SHOW
PRIVATELY-INSURED PATIENTS ARE AT FINANCIAL RISK 16 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-19-292.pdf.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-3\DPL305.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 13

30-AUG-22

BALANCE BILLING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

11:09

809

ance bills for such out-of-network air ambulatory services averaged
around $20,000.108 This prohibition on regulating the costs of air ambulance services prevents states from enacting legislation to protect
patients in certain emergency situations when they may be especially
vulnerable.109
The second major area in which state law cannot regulate balance
billing involves self-insured plans.110 Since the enactment of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974, the
Department of Labor has had the sole ability to monitor and regulate
self-insured employee benefit plans established by private sector employers.111 About sixty-one percent of workers with employer-sponsored health insurance are enrolled in self-insured ERISA plans.112
Therefore, even in states like California and New York with the most
comprehensive balance billing regulations, 113 state law cannot protect
patients insured through employee benefit plans.114 As a result, the
only solution to regulating balance billing in situations involving air
ambulance or self-insured plans is federal regulation.115
Lastly, state balance billing regulations cannot fully protect patients
who receive treatment from out-of-state providers.116 Washington
temporarily has a plan to hold patients harmless who receive a balance bill after seeking emergency care in a different state, but in doing
so, the insurance provider will likely be responsible for the balance
bill, a compromise that insurance companies will not be too eager to
accept.117 Therefore, just like with self-insured plans and air ambulance services, federal regulations are necessary to combat balance
billing in interstate situations.118

108. Erin C. Fuse Brown et al., Out-of-Network Air Ambulance Bills: Prevalence, Magnitude,
and Policy Solutions, 98 MILBANK Q. 747, 748, 757 (2020).
109. U.S. DEP’T

OF

HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 55, at 7.

110. LUCIA ET AL., supra note 68, at 2.
111. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 55, at 11.
112. Id.
113. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5; CORLETTE & HOPPE, supra note 99, at 3; Barack D. Richman et al., Battling the Chargemaster: A Simple Remedy to Balance Billing for Unavoidable Outof-Network Care, 23 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e100, e102 (2017).
114. Gray, supra note 78, at 1650.
115. Brown et al., supra note 108, at 748.
116. Hoadley et al., State Are Taking New Steps, supra note 79.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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E. Recent Federal Proposals to Regulate Balance Billing in the
Private Sector
The federal government has recognized that state balance billing
regulations are lacking in certain areas and need urgent attention. To
that end, several legislative committees have recently developed proposals to combat balance billing in the private insurance market.119 In
fact, actual balance billing legislation in the form of the No Surprises
Act took effect on January 1, 2022.120 This surprise balance billing legislation was part of the recent $900 billion COVID-19 relief package
signed into law by President Trump on December 27, 2020.121 Prior to
the enactment of the No Surprises Act, two influential federal proposals, the Consumer Protections Against Medical Bills Act of 2020
(H.R. 5826) and the Ban Surprise Billing Act (H.R. 5800), were
presented at the 116th United States Congress.122 Although those bills
have since died, they act as an effective tool for evaluating the No
Surprises Act since each bill had a similar purpose. The No Surprises
Act “adopts a comprehensive approach to protecting consumers from
surprise medical bills.”123 Similarly, the Consumer Protections
Against Medical Bills Act of 2020 pledged to “protect Americans
from unexpected financial burdens when receiving health care.”124
The Ban Surprise Billing Act also claimed to be a “bipartisan solution
that protects patients from unexpected, often significant out-of-pocket
costs while being fair to both providers and payers.”125 However, despite having nearly the same purpose, each bill differs significantly in
key aspects. For instance, while the Ban Surprise Billing Act and the
No Surprises Act offer protection against balance billing in the con119. Press Release, Comm. On Educ. & Lab. Republicans, Comm. Advances Bipartisan Solution to Ban Surprise Billing (Feb. 11, 2020), https://republicans-edlabor.house.gov/news/docu
mentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=406879; Rachel Stauffer & Katie Waldo, Surprise Billing Background and Comparison, MCDERMOTT PLUS (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.mcdermottplus.com/
insights/surprise-billing-background-and-comparison-updated-feb-2020/.
120. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Surprise Billing & Protection (Jan. 14, 2022),
https://www.cms.gov/nosurprises/Ending-Surprise-Medical-Bills.
121. Emily Boerger, Congress Passes Surprise Medical Billing Fix, ST. REFORM (Dec. 22,
2020), https://stateofreform.com/federal/2020/12/congress-passes-surprise-medical-billing-fix/;
Jack Hoadley et al., Unpacking the No Surprises Act: An Opportunity to Protect Millions,
HEALTH AFFS. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201217.247010/
full/ [Hoadley et al., Unpacking the No Surprises Act].
122. Press Release, Ways & Means Comm., Neal and Brady Release Legislative Text of Surprise Medical Billing Proposal (Feb. 7, 2020), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/
press-releases/neal-and-brady-release-legislative-text-surprise-medical-billing; Press Release,
Comm. on Educ. & Labor Republicans, supra note 119.
123. Hoadley et al., Unpacking the No Surprises Act, supra note 121.
124. Press Release, Ways & Means Comm., supra note 122.
125. Press Release, Comm. On Educ. & Labor, supra note 119.
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text of air ambulance services, the Consumer Protections against Surprise Medical Bills Act of 2020 failed to do so.126 Therefore, analyzing
each bill’s provisions provides insight as to whether Congress chose
the most comprehensive balance billing legislation to include in its
COVID-19 relief package. On February 7, 2020, the Ways and Means
Committee of the federal government released the official legislative
text of the Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act
of 2020.127 The introduction of this bill explicitly states that the bill
existed to “prevent certain cases of out of-network surprise medical
bills, strengthen health care consumer protections, and improve health
care information transparency . . . .”128
Quite conveniently, just a few days later on February 11, 2020, the
Committee on Education and Labor advanced the Ban Surprise Billing Act.129 Representative Foxx (R), one of the sponsors of the Ban
Surprise Billing Act, indicated that this bill was designed to give patients “financial confidence” and to “shield American families from
financially devastating surprise medical bills.”130 The No Surprises
Act, which would ultimately garner the most support, was actually introduced on January 3, 2019 and was advanced by both the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Education and Labor.131 The No
Surprises Act has the general purpose of “protect[ing] health care
consumers from surprise billing practices.”132 The No Surprises Act
had seemingly lost traction in Congress until the COVID-19 pandemic
reengaged lawmakers’ attention after the increase in surprise medical
bills and the simultaneous impact on Americans’ ability to pay these
unexpected costs.133 As a result, the No Surprises Act became part of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021.134
In summary, prior to the enactment of the No Surprises Act, federal
balance billing regulations only governed services rendered under
126. Ban Surprise Billing Act, H.R. 5800, 116th Cong. § 2(f)(1) (2020); No Surprises Act,
H.R. 3630, 116th Cong. § 5(a) (2020); Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act
of 2020, H.R. 5826, 116th Cong. § 1(b) (2020).
127. Press Release, Ways & Means Comm., supra note 122.
128. H.R. 5826, 116th Cong.
129. Press Release, Comm. On Educ. & Labor, supra note 119.
130. Id.
131. H.R. 3630, 116th Cong.
132. Id.
133. Matthew J. Goldman & Theresa E. Thompson, No Surprises Act Comes as a Surprise –
Consolidated Appropriations Act Includes New Restrictions on Surprise Bills, 11 NAT’L L. REV.,
Jan. 4, 2021, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/no-surprises-act-comes-surprise-consolidatedappropriations-act-includes-new.
134. H.R. 133, 116th Cong. 2020.
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Medicare and Medicaid.135 While some states have tried to fill the
gaps in federal balance billing legislation by regulating balance billing
in the private sector,136 the comprehensiveness of these regulations
varies between states.137
Therefore, to determine whether either of the three recent federal
proposals to regulate balance billing would have been effective, each
bill must be analyzed in terms of the four factors encompassing “comprehensive balance billing legislation” described in Part II.138 The federal bills must also be evaluated in terms of how effectively they
regulate the specific areas that state balance billing regulations cannot
reach, namely air ambulance service charges and self-insured plans.
Lastly, the No Surprises Act will be analyzed in the context of the four
comprehensive factors and reviewed against the other surprise billing
proposals to determine whether the No Surprises Act achieves comprehensive balance billing protections or whether Congress should
consider enacting one of the other proposals in the future to achieve
the goal of comprehensive balance billing protection. 139 Finally, this
Comment will explore the obstacles that the No Surprises Act may
face after its enactment.140
III.

ANALYSIS

The Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills Act of
2020 (H.R. 5826), the Ban Surprise Billing Act (H.R. 5800), and the
No Surprises Act (H.R. 3630) all represent solutions to the issues associated with balance billing.141 Consequently, in order to be deemed
adequate, each bill must satisfy the four factors that constitute comprehensive balance billing regulation.142 Additionally, in order to be
considered comprehensive, each federal proposal must offer sufficient
protection for users of air-ambulance services and those insured under
135. SHEN, supra note 37, at 2.
136. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 13.
137. Id. To reiterate, in order to be considered comprehensive, the regulations must generally
satisfy four factors: (1) extending protections to both emergency department and in-network
hospital settings, (2) applying laws to all types of insurance, including both HMOs and PPOs, (3)
protecting consumers both by holding them harmless from extra provider charges and prohibiting providers from balance billing, and (4) adopting an adequate payment standard or a dispute
resolution process to resolve payment disputes between providers and insurers. Hoadley, supra
note 54, at 4.
138. See supra Part II.E.
139. H.R. 5800, 116th Cong.; H.R. 5826, 116th Cong.
140. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 2–3.
141. See infra Part III; H.R. 5800, 116th Cong.; H.R. 3630, 116th Cong.; H.R. 5826, 116th
Cong.
142. See infra Part III.
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ERISA plans, the two main areas that state regulations cannot
reach.143 Lastly, since the federal government ultimately chose the No
Surprises Act, it is necessary to evaluate whether the federal government made the appropriate decision or whether it should have chosen
one of the other balance billing proposals instead.144
A. The Consumer Protections Against Surprise Medical Bills
Act of 2020
In terms of factor one, extending protection to emergency and innetwork hospital visits, the Consumer Protections Against Surprise
Medical Bills Act of 2020 (Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act)
promised to prohibit balance billing for all emergency services.145 In
fact, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act explicitly stated that
the “cost-sharing requirement [for emergency services will not be]
greater than the requirement that would apply if such services were
furnished by a participating provider or a participating emergency facility.”146 Therefore, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act
solved the problem of balance billing for emergency services at nonnetwork facilities that Illinois’s comprehensive regulations left unaddressed.147 Consequently, in the realm of emergency medical care, this
bill offered more protection than already existing comprehensive state
balance billing regulations.148 Similarly, with regard to non-emergency
care provided by out-of-network providers at in-network facilities, the
patient would only be responsible for the in-network rate.149 In addition to services provided by standard physicians, ancillary services
provided by out-of-network physicians such as anesthesiologists or
radiologists would be calculated at the in-network rate as well.150
Therefore, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act fully protected patients seeking emergency and non-emergency services, satisfying the first factor of comprehensive balance billing regulation.151
However, a major caveat existed when it came to nonparticipating
providers in non-emergency situations.152 If the nonparticipating provider gave the patient notice that he was an out-of-network provider
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
H.R. 5826, 116th Cong. § 2(a).
Id. at § 2(a)(1)(A)(III)(ii).
Id.; see 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.3a (2011).
§ 5/356z.3a.
Stauffer & Waldo, supra note 119.
Id.; Murphy, supra note 12.
Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5826, 116th Cong § 1150C(b)(2)(A) (2020).
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forty-eight hours prior to rendering medical services or on the day on
which the patient obtained the appointment for such services and the
patient provided his consent, the patient would be responsible for
higher cost-sharing obligations.153 Although this process favored the
provider since a patient may not have the opportunity to find a participating provider in time to obtain the services he may desperately
need after receiving said notice, it inevitably eliminated the “surprise”
factor that characterizes balance billing.154 Patients may not be
pleased to know that their insurance will not cover their entire treatment, but at least with the notice and consent requirement, they could
brace themselves for the payment to come.155
Next, in order to satisfy factor two, balance billing regulations must
apply to all types of insurance, protecting both HMO and PPO beneficiaries as well as members of self-insured plans.156 The Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act complied with factor two because this bill
did not differentiate balance billing protection based on the patient’s
type of insurance plan.157 It can be inferred that the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act intentionally did not make a distinction based
on plan type in order to incorporate self-insured plans that ERISA
does not allow states to regulate.158 Essentially, if the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act did not protect people with self-insured
plans, it would not satisfy factor two because it would be failing to
protect an entire sect of people that state laws legally cannot safeguard.159 However, because the Consumer Protections Medical Bills
Act seemed to offer protections to people with self-insured plans, this
bill satisfied factor two.160
Furthermore, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act also satisfied factor three, the hold harmless provision, by committing to not
only hold patients harmless from surprise medical bills, but also by
prohibiting providers from sending such bills in the first place.161 The
Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act explicitly states that an
“emergency department shall not bill, and shall not hold liable, the
individual for a payment amount for such emergency services so fur153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4, 6.
157. H.R. 5826 § 1.
158. Not allowing protections for self-insured plans would essentially defeat one of the main
purposes of federal balance billing regulations.
159. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 6.
160. See generally H.R. 5826; Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
161. H.R. 5826 § 1150C(a)(1).
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nished that is more than the cost-sharing amount for such services.”162
The phrases “shall not bill” and “shall not hold liable” illustrate that
providers would be forbidden from balance billing and that patients
would also be held harmless for not paying such bills.163 The same
held true for out-of-network providers since “a nonparticipating provider . . . shall not bill, and shall not hold liable, such individual for a
payment amount . . . that is more than the cost-sharing amount.”164
Consequently, in the context of both emergency and nonemergency
services, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act fully protected
patients from balance bills.165
Lastly, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act fulfilled the
fourth and final factor of comprehensive balance billing, providing an
adequate payment standard or dispute resolution process, because this
bill adopted a clear payment dispute resolution procedure.166 Although the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act did not include a
payment standard, this did not preclude the bill from being considered
“comprehensive” because having a dispute resolution procedure alone
is sufficient to satisfy the fourth factor.167 However, unlike New
York’s dispute resolution process, the solution proposed by the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act did not set a minimum billing
amount that must exist before triggering the arbitration process.168
Without a minimum, the arbitration process that works so well in New
York would not act as efficiently at the federal level since the lack of a
minimum threshold increases the risk of constant arbitration for minimal payment amounts.169 As a result, it would take a while for arbiters
to become available for providers and insurers who actually need arbitration to decide more significant payment disputes.170 Nevertheless,
the payments that the arbiter ultimately agreed on would have likely
been quite accurate since the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act
prevented arbiters from considering usual and customary charges, a
more subjective approach, when deciding the payment owed.171 As a
result, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act did, in fact, meet
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
166. H.R. 5826 § 1150C(b)(1).
167. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
168. Brannon & Kemp, supra note 35, at 43; Stauffer & Waldo, supra note 119.
169. Brannon & Kemp, supra note 35, at 43.
170. Id. (“Without [a minimum threshold], providers and insurers would be able to abuse IDR
in trivial disagreements.”).
171. Id.
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factor four despite potential issues that would possibly arise once its
dispute resolution process was enacted.172
Although the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act coincided
with the four comprehensive balance billing factors, it failed to shield
patients from one major area of balance billing to which federal balance billing regulations should apply: air ambulance services.173 Instead of providing air ambulance protections, the Consumer
Protections Medical Bills Act simply called for more transparency in
health plans.174 Transparency, however, is not enough since the average consumer may not have the specialized skillset to understand insurance rate breakdowns and may not be able to evaluate his
insurance plan when facing life or death situations.175 For instance, the
Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act required health plans to include information about out-of-network deductibles and cost-sharing
obligations for emergency services so that the patients would be informed about payment amounts.176 However, state regulations can
just as easily include these transparency plans in their balance billing
laws since nothing in state or federal law prevents them from doing so,
which is not the case with air ambulance regulations.177
Therefore, the proposed Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act
was overall lacking and rather weak because it essentially mirrored
the most comprehensive state plans and failed to fill many of the gaps
which are within the federal government’s exclusive power to regulate.178 There is no need for the federal government to provide balance billing regulations that states are capable of enacting themselves.
The purpose of the federal plans should be to regulate areas outside of
the states’ reach.179 However, aside from the inclusion of beneficiaries
of self-insured plans in the proposal, the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act failed to offer enough extra protections to make this proposal more attractive than a comprehensive state plan.180 For this
172. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
173. Id.
174. H.R. 5826, 116th Cong. § 5 (2020).
175. See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., How Price Transparency Can Control the Cost of
Health Care (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2016/03/how-price-transparency-controls-health-care-cost.html.
176. MCDERMOTT PLUS, Details of the Major Surprise Billing Proposals (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.mcdermottplus.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Details-of-the-Major-Surprise-Billing-Proposals-Chart-2020.pdf.
177. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994).
178. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
179. LUCIA ET AL., supra note 68, at 7.
180. H.R. 5826, 116th Cong. § 1(b) (2020).
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reason, the federal government made the proper decision in not taking action on the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act.181
B. The Ban Surprise Billing Act
Despite the inadequacy of the Consumer Protections Medical Bills
Act, the Ban Surprise Billing Act still had potential.182 Like the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act, the Ban Surprise Billing Act also
offered protection against balance billing for all emergency services.183 The Ban Surprise Billing Act explicitly states that the insurer
shall cover emergency services “whether the health care provider furnishing such services is a participating provider or a participating
emergency facility.”184 Unlike comprehensive state laws like those in
Illinois, the Ban Surprise Billing Act’s language indicated that nonnetwork emergency departments would also be included in balance
billing regulations.185 For example, the regulation covered services
that “are provided to a participant or beneficiary by a nonparticipating provider or a nonparticipating emergency facility.”186 Furthermore, with regard to non-emergency services, the Ban Surprise Billing
Act also limited the cost-sharing amount to the amount that “would
apply under such plan or coverage, respectively, had such items or
services been furnished by a participating provider.”187 Although the
same notice and consent caveat that existed for the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act was also contained in the Ban Surprise Billing
Act,188 the Ban Surprise Billing Act still satisfied factor one just like
the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act because it prohibited balance billing patients in emergency settings and when receiving treatment from out-of-network providers at in-network facilities.189
With regard to factor two, applying laws to all types of insurance,
the Ban Surprise Billing Act did not appear to make a distinction regarding protection based on the type of insurance plan a patient had,
indicating that this bill would also protect patients with self-insured
ERISA plans against balance billing like the Consumer Protections
181. See CONGRESS.GOV, All Actions H.R. 5826–116th Congress (2019-2020), https://
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5826/all-actions (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).
182. H.R. 5800 offers broader protections than H.R. 5826 that will be explored more in depth
in Part III.B.
183. MCDERMOTT PLUS, supra note 176.
184. H.R. 5800, 116th Cong. § 716(b)(1)(B) (2020).
185. Id. § 716(b)(1)(C).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 716(e)(1)(A).
188. Id. § 2799A-2(d)(1).
189. MCDERMOTT PLUS, supra note 176.
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Medical Bills Act.190 Therefore, the Ban Surprise Billing Act satisfied
factor two as well.191
However, an issue arose when evaluating the Ban Surprise Billing
Act in terms of factor three, the hold harmless provision, particularly
regarding emergency service providers.192 This bill protected patients
receiving treatment from nonparticipating, nonemergency providers
to the fullest extent.193 For instance, the bill explicitly stated that nonparticipating providers “shall not bill, and shall not hold liable such . . .
beneficiary . . . for a payment amount . . . that is more than the costsharing amount for such item or service.”194 Therefore, this bill fulfilled the standard for comprehensive coverage regarding nonparticipating providers in nonemergency settings.195 Under the Ban Surprise
Billing Act, those who visit the hospital to have a scheduled surgery,
for example, and interact with an out-of-network anesthesiologist,
would not have to worry about paying balance bills because these
providers would legally be prohibited from sending them in the first
place.196
There would still be concern regarding the overall level of protection offered to patients who received emergency services under the
Ban Surprise Billing Act, based on the text of the legislation.197 While
the Ban Surprise Billing Act forbade participating providers from balance billing in nonemergency settings,198 it imposed no such prohibitions on nonparticipating providers who rendered emergency care.199
Just like the provision regarding nonparticipating providers at in-network facilitates, this bill explicitly stated that an emergency provider
or department “shall not hold the . . . beneficiary . . . liable for a payment amount . . . that is more than the cost-sharing amount for such
services.”200 Although the language indicated that patients would not
be penalized for failing to pay a surprise bill in the context of an emergency, there was no penalty if providers chose to send these patients
balance bills anyway.201 Therefore, in some instances, these providers
would still succeed in receiving a payment on a balance bill if an un190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

H.R. 5800 § 2(b)(1).
Id.; Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5800 § 2799A-1(a)(1).
Id. § 2799A-2(a).
Id.
Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5800 § 2799A-2(a).
Id. § 2799A-1(a)(1).
Id. § 2799A-2(a).
Id. § 2799A-1(a)(1).
Id. § 2799A-1(a)(2).
Id.
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knowing patient, in fear of becoming past due on a bill and unaware
of his rights, panicked and paid the bill. As a result, the Ban Surprise
Billing Act did not meet the criteria required to satisfy factor three.202
However, the thorough method in which the Ban Surprise Billing Act
planned to resolve payment disputes as well as the additional protections it afforded made up for its mildly inadequate standard of provider liability.203
Although only one solution to resolving payment disputes is necessary to deem balance billing regulations comprehensive,204 the Ban
Surprise Billing Act included both mechanisms in its proposal.205 First,
the Ban Surprise Billing Act included a benchmark payment standard
that providers and insurers must use for payment disputes amounting
to less than $750.206 By forcing entities to utilize a payment standard
when the amount of money at issue is relatively small, arbitration
would not be wasted on minuscule amounts.207 Furthermore, there
would be more arbiters available in situations where arbitration is actually necessary, such as when there are larger amounts in dispute and
the entities require a third party’s evaluation.208 Moreover, the Ban
Surprise Billing Act required as the payment standard a “marketbased benchmark of the median in-network rate.”209 Therefore, the
Ban Surprise Billing Act got rid of the usual and customary provider
charges that some states like Florida use in favor of a more reliable
formula to ensure greater accuracy when calculating the payments actually owed.210
In addition to the benchmark payment standard, the Ban Surprise
Billing Act included an IDR process that would allow arbitration
when the amount in dispute exceeded $750.211 This process essentially
mirrored the baseball-style arbitration process adopted in New
York.212 Because the baseball-style of arbitration has shown success
and has proved to be an unbiased approach for resolving disputes in
New York, there is no reason to doubt that this process would work
any differently at the federal level.213 Therefore, since the Ban Sur202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5800 §§ 4, 2799A-4.
Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5800 § 4(b)(2)(A), (d).
Id. § 4(b)(2)(A).
Brannon & Kemp, supra note 35, at 43–44.
Id.
Press Release, Comm. on Educ. & Labor Republicans, supra note 119.
H.R. 5800 § 716(b)(2)(E); HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 10.
H.R. 5800 § 4(b)(2)(A).
Brannon & Kemp, supra note 35, at 44.
Id.
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prise Billing Act gave providers and insurers multiple options to resolve payment disputes, it undoubtedly exceeeded the factor four
requirements for comprehensive balance billing regulations.214
Furthermore, the Ban Surprise Billing Act extensively protected air
ambulance services – an area which the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act disregarded.215 Specifically, the Ban Surprise Billing Act
states that in the case of a beneficiary who is furnished air ambulance
services from a nonparticipating provider, “such provider shall not
bill, and shall not hold liable, such participant, beneficiary.”216 Therefore, not only would patients receiving air ambulance services not
have to pay a balance bill, the Ban Surprise Billing Act would prohibit
air ambulance providers from sending these patients balance bills in
the first place.217 This section of the Ban Surprise Billing Act thus
further satisfied factor three.218 Furthermore, even though most people would not be able to pay an air ambulance bill, the fact that the
Ban Surprise Billing Act prevented providers from sending bills in this
context would eliminate any added stress and confusion that a person
who had just gone through a traumatic, life-threatening situation
would likely experience from receiving such a costly bill.219
The Ban Surprise Billing Act overwhelmingly met the criteria required to characterize it as a comprehensive balance billing regulation.220 Although providers retained the ability to balance bill for
emergency services,221 the protections the Ban Surprise Billing Act
offered were more than sufficient given that it also restricted the ability of air ambulance providers to balance bill patients. In order to be
considered comprehensive, a federal proposal must exceed the protections already offered by state balance billing regulations, and the Ban
Surprise Billing Act delivered.222 Not only did the Ban Surprise Billing Act offer extensive protection for beneficiaries of self-insured
plans,223 but it also prevented balance billing in the context of air ambulance services,224 an action that the Consumer Protections Medical
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5800 § 2799A-4.
Id.
Id.
Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
Receiving a surprise medical bill would stress out any reasonable person.
Hoadley, supra note 54, at 4.
H.R. 5800 § 2799A-1(a)(2).
LUCIA ET AL., supra note 68, at 7.
See generally H.R. 5800.
Id. § 2799A-4.
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Bills Act failed to take.225 On its face, the Ban Surprise Billing Act
seemed worth pursuing. However, Congress ultimately chose to enact
the No Surprises Act.226 Therefore, to determine whether Congress
made the proper decision in choosing to enact the No Surprises Act
over the Ban Surprise Billing Act, it is necessary to analyze the No
Surprises Act as well.
C. The No Surprises Act
Despite the comprehensive character of the Ban Surprise Billing
Act, Congress nevertheless chose to incorporate the No Surprises Act
into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, and in doing so, Congress made the correct choice since the No Surprises Act satisfies all
the necessary factors that make federal balance billing legislation
comprehensive.227 In terms of the first factor regarding the extension
of balance billing protections in emergency and in-network hospital
settings,228 the No Surprises Act successfully meets the criteria. First
of all, with regard to emergency services, the No Surprises Act specifically indicates that nonparticipating emergency providers or facilities
must not impose “coverage that is more restrictive than the requirements or limitations that apply to emergency services received from
participating providers and participating emergency facilities.”229
Therefore, the No Surprises Act protects individuals obtaining emergency care not only from receiving balance bills from out-of-network
emergency physicians at in-network facilities, but also from out-ofnetwork facilities in general.230 Similarly, with regard to nonemergency care, out-of-network providers must “not impose on such . . .
beneficiary . . . a cost-sharing requirement . . . greater than the costsharing requirement that would apply under such plan or coverage.”231 Therefore, in terms of emergency and nonemergency care, the
No Surprises Act satisfies factor one on the comprehensiveness
scale.232 Although a notice and consent provision exists that would
allow nonparticipating providers to balance bill their patients,233 this
provision is standard as illustrated by its existence in both the Con225. H.R. 5826, 116th Cong. § 10(a)(2)(A) (2020) (only mentioning reporting requirements
regarding air ambulance services).
226. Hoadley et al., Unpacking the No Surprises Act, supra note 121.
227. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 3–4; Brown et al., supra note 108, at 748.
228. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 3–4.
229. H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 2799A-1(a)(1)(C)(i) (2020).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 2799A-1(b)(1)(A).
232. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 3.
233. H.R. 133 § 2799A-1(b)(1)(A).
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sumer Protections Medical Bills Act and the Ban Surprise Billing
Act234 and therefore, should not impact whether the No Surprises Act
meets the criteria for factor one.
Next, in terms of the second factor, having the regulations apply to
all types of insurance, not only does the No Surprises Act make no
distinction regarding protections for HMOs or PPOs, but the No Surprises Act also explicitly includes coverage for self-insured ERISA
plans, something that the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act and
the Ban Surprise Billing Act failed to do.235 Similar to the protections
offered in factor one, the No Surprises Act will amend ERISA so that
if a “health insurance issuer offering group health insurance coverage,
provides or covers any benefits with respect to services in an emergency department . . . the . . . issuer shall cover emergency services.”236
Similarly, if a group health plan or health insurance issuer offers coverage furnished by a nonparticipating provider, the plan must “not
impose on [the] participant or beneficiary a cost-sharing requirement
. . . that is greater than the cost-sharing requirement that would apply
. . . had such items or services been furnished by a participating provider.”237 Consequently, the No Surprises Act more thoroughly satisfies factor two than the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act and
the Ban Surprise Billing Act because instead of having to assume that
self-insured plans are protected from balance billing, the No Surprises
Act explicitly guarantees that those who have coverage under selfinsured plans are protected.238 Therefore, in terms of factor two, Congress made the right decision by including the No Surprises Act in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 over the other surprise billing
proposals.
Furthermore, the No Surprises Act also offers the most complete
protections in terms of holding individuals harmless who may be susceptible to balance billing, thereby satisfying factor three as well. With
regard to both emergency care and out-of-network care performed by
nonparticipating providers, the No Surprises Act holds beneficiaries
harmless and prohibits providers from sending balance bills in the first
place.239 The No Surprises Act specifically states that nonparticipating
234. Stauffer & Waldo, supra note 119.
235. H.R. 133 § 102(b); see infra Part III.A–B.
236. H.R. 133 § 2799A-1.
237. Id. § 2799A-1(b)(1)
238. Id. § 102(b).
239. Press Release, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Congressional Committee
Leaders Announce Surprise Billing Agreement (Dec. 11, 2020), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/
No%20Surprise%20Act%20Section-by-Section%2012-11-20.pdf.
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emergency departments and providers “shall not bill, and shall not
hold liable” beneficiaries.240 The same language is used for out-ofnetwork providers delivering nonemergency care as well.241 Because
the Ban Surprise Billing Act did not prohibit providers from sending
balance bills in the context of emergency care, the No Surprises Act
undoubtedly surpasses the Ban Surprise Billing Act in this aspect.242
Although the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act protected beneficiaries seeking ordinary emergency and nonnetwork care in the
same capacity as the No Surprises Act in terms of factor three,243 the
No Surprises Act nevertheless outdoes the Consumer Protections
Medical Bills Act because it offers more protections against liability
when it comes to air ambulance services, a provision absent from the
Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act .244
Lastly, as illustrated above, the deciding factor in terms of comprehensive balance billing legislation is encapsulated in factor four: the
dispute resolution method a federal balance billing proposal chooses
to adopt.245 In the case of the No Surprises Act, the No Surprises Act
states that providers and insurers must resolve payment disputes using
an IDR process similar to the dispute resolution provisions in both the
Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act and the Ban Surprise Billing
Act.246 According to the No Surprises Act, if, after opening negotiations, a provider and insurer cannot come to an agreement regarding
payment for services, either party may initiate a dispute resolution
process in which an unbiased entity will determine the amount of payment based on a variety of factors.247 As with the other proposals,
according to the No Surprises Act, both the provider and insurer
“shall each submit to the certified IDR entity . . . an offer for a payment amount,” and the IDR entity must “select one of the offers submitted.”248 In this baseball-style arbitration the parties must accept
the payment amount the arbiter chooses, making payment of that
amount binding on the respective parties.249 However, a possible con
of the IDR process in the No Surprises Act is that there is no mini240. H.R. 133 § 2799B-1(a)(1).
241. Id. § 2799B-2(a).
242. H.R. 5800 § 2799A-1(a)(2).
243. Stauffer & Waldo, supra note 119.
244. See generally H.R. 5826; H.R. 133 § 9822(d)(1).
245. HOADLEY & LUCIA, supra note 52, at 10.
246. Press Release, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra note 239; H.R. 5826
§ 1150C(b)(1); H.R. 5800 § 4(a)(1).
247. H.R. 133 § 103(a)(c)(1)(B).
248. Id. § 103(a)(c)(5)(A)(i), (B)(i)(I).
249. Hoadley et al., Unpacking the No Surprises Act, supra note 121.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-3\DPL305.txt

824

unknown

Seq: 28

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

30-AUG-22

11:09

[Vol. 71:797

mum dollar amount to trigger the dispute resolution process.250 As a
result, as stated previously, the IDR process may not work as efficiently because allowing IDR for all payment disputes, without a minimum threshold, leads to more frequent arbitration and requires more
resources than what may be available.251 Nevertheless, having the
IDR process in place satisfies the fourth factor that makes balance
billing regulation comprehensive, and therefore, the No Surprises Act
constitutes a comprehensive balance billing regulation that incorporates the four principal factors discussed throughout this Comment.252
Moreover, Congress ultimately made the correct decision in incorporating the No Surprises Act into the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021 rather than the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act or
the Ban Surprise Billing Act because the No Surprises Act also offers
extensive protections for beneficiaries utilizing air ambulance services,
an area that only federal law can regulate. For example, the No Surprises Act specifically states that “[t]he provisions of sections
2799B–1, 2799B–2, [and] 2799B–3 . . . shall apply to . . . an air ambulance provider[s],” and those are the provisions ridding beneficiaries
of any liability in terms of surprise medical bills.253 Therefore, the No
Surprises Act is most effective in thoroughly protecting individuals
who utilize air ambulance services. Unlike the Consumer Protections
Medical Bills Act that failed to address air ambulance services, the No
Surprises Act not only shields individuals from liability if they utilize
air ambulance services, but it also goes a step further and prohibits
providers from sending bills for such services.254 Furthermore, although the Ban Surprise Billing Act essentially offered the same protections in terms of air ambulance use,255 the fact that the No
Surprises Act offers more complete protection to those seeking emergency care and offers greater clarity regarding self-insured plans indicates that Congress properly selected the No Surprises Act to be a
part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021.256 However, although the No Surprises Act took effect in January of 2022,257 it is still
necessary to explore the obstacles that this novel Act may experience
once it is enacted.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

H.R. 133 § 103(c).
Brannon & Kemp, supra note 3, at 43.
Hoadley, supra note 54, at 3–4.
H.R. 133 § 9822(d)(1).
See id. §§ 2799B-1(a)(1), 2799B-2(a).
H.R. 5800 § 2799A-4.
H.R. 133 §§ 102(b), 2799B-1(a)(1).
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 120.
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IV. IMPACT
Even after its enactment, the No Surprises Act may still face several
obstacles.258 Private challenges under the Takings Clause, for example, may be capable of voiding federal balance billing regulation in the
private sector.259 Lobbying groups have the potential to denounce and
destroy such federal balance billing regulations as well.260
A. Obstacles to Federal Balance Billing Regulations
Enacting comprehensive balance billing regulations at the state or
federal level would mitigate the financial and emotional impact of receiving a surprise hospital bill.261 Moreover, the impact of federal legislation like the No Surprises Act has an even further reach than state
plans since these federal laws alone can protect the 2.4 million Americans insured by ERISA self-funded plans262 and those who require air
ambulance services.263 Although the No Surprises Act has the ability
to protect patients in areas that state laws cannot reach, the No Surprises Act may face unique challenges and complex litigation once enacted, forcing federal balance billing regulations back to square
one.264
1. The Threat of the Takings Clause
The first major issue regarding federal balance billing regulations
derives from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.265 The Takings Clause states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”266 Because nothing is physically being taken from providers with balance billing regulations, the federal
government may only violate the Takings Clause if the federal balance
billing regulations are so burdensome as to become a taking.267 Courts
then weigh the following three factors when determining whether the
federal government’s action amounts to a taking: (1) the economic
258. See infra Part IV.A.
259. See infra Part IV.A.i.
260. See infra Part IV.A.ii.
261. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U.L. REV.
127, 138 (2017); David A. Hyman et al., Surprise Medical Bills: How to Protect Patients and
Make Care More Affordable, 108 GEO. L.L. 1655, 1674 (2020).
262. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., Fact Sheet: What is ERISA?, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/
about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa (last visited May 2, 2022).
263. Hyman et al., supra note 261, at 1671.
264. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 7.
265. Id.
266. U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4.
267. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 7.
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impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action as an adjustment or an invasion.268 Therefore, physicians will likely argue that the
federal balance billing regulations implicate these factors in an attempt to keep balance billing intact so that they continue to receive a
higher income.269
For instance, some providers and practice groups insist that the No
Surprises Act fully implicates all three factors of the “takings” test
since the No Surprises Act “threatens to both systematically devalue
medical licenses and commandeer physical healthcare resources without providing just compensation.”270 On the other hand, those in support of federal balance billing legislation may argue, more powerfully
and likely more successfully, that while prohibiting providers from
balance billing may cause the providers to lose a portion of their income, providers will undoubtedly still receive sufficient payments
from a patient’s insurer.271 Although the providers will not receive the
out-of-network rates they hoped to obtain by remaining out-of-network, they will nonetheless receive in-network rates for the services
they perform.272 Furthermore, according to the notice and consent requirement of the No Surprises Act, these regulations do not affect
patients who have consented to out-of-network care beforehand and
who are willing to pay a balance bill in exchange for services from a
specific provider.273 As a result, the economic impact in terms of the
first factor for determining a taking is likely not severe enough to constitute a taking.274 Additionally, while providers have invested in their
medical licenses,275 just as with factor one, the impact of federal balance billing regulations on providers’ ability to practice is not grave
enough to implicate factor two either.276 The No Surprises Act lacks
any provisions indicating that it will strip doctors of their licenses or
forbid them from engaging in a specific practice area.277 Therefore,
the federal balance billing regulations do not interfere with invest268. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
269. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 7.
270. Id.
271. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 8.
272. Id.
273. H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 2799A-1(b)(1)(A) (2020).
274. Christen Linke Young, Federal Surprise Billing Legislation Does Not Violate the Constitution, BROOKINGS (July 1, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-onhealth-policy/2019/07/01/federal-surprise-billing-legislation-does-not-violate-the-constitution/.
275. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 9.
276. Young, supra note 274.
277. See H.R. 133.
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ment-backed expectations to the point of invoking the Takings
Clause.278 The government’s action also represents a “targeted adjustment” to protect consumers from the potential greedy nature of
healthcare providers.279 With the federal balance billing regulations,
the federal government does not invade the providers’ rights but instead, relieves patients of the surprise as well as the burden of paying
unexpected costs for necessary care.280 Consequently, although some
providers may make a Takings Clause argument in an attempt to put a
halt to the No Surprises Act,281 this argument should fail, and the No
Surprises Act should not face such Takings Clause issues when enacted. However, since there are arguments to be made on both sides,
only time will tell if the No Surprises Act will face Takings Clause
litigation and if the No Surprises Act will remain in effect, especially
considering the impact that lobbying groups can have on federal balance billing legislation.
2. The Threat of Lobbying Groups
In addition to the Takings Clause, the federal government must also
consider the power of lobbying groups to sway members of Congress
when attempting to enact balance billing regulations. In 2019, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions and the
House Energy and Commerce Committee reached a compromise regarding their respective balance billing proposals, incorporating the
best aspects of each proposal into one bill.282 Passage of the bill
looked promising. However, December 2019 came, and the bill did
not pass.283 The bill failed because private equity-backed physician
staffing companies and a lobbying group known as Doctor Patient
Unity spent up to $28 million in ad campaigns to discourage House
and Senate leaders from passing the bill, and their efforts worked.284
Although Congress has already passed the No Surprises Act, the federal government must still remain vigilant and not underestimate the
power of lobbying groups because such groups have already begun to
question the legitimacy of rulemaking related to the No Surprises Act
278. Young, supra note 274.
279. Id.
280. CLEMENT, supra note 21, at 9.
281. Id. at 7.
282. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Stalled Federal Efforts to End Surprise Billing-The Role of Private
Equity, 98 N.E. J. MED. 1189, 1190 (2020).
283. See id.
284. Id.; Hyman et al., supra note 261, at 1674 (“[A] vigorous ad campaign [was established]
on the part of the affected specialties who would stand to lose money should such a law be
enacted . . . .”).
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and have succeeded. For example, the members of the largest state
medical society in the country, the Texas Medical Association, came
together to file suit against the U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services (HHS) to challenge rulemaking it issued in relation to the No
Surprises Act in October 2021.285 In February 2022, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas sided with the Texas Medical
Association and vacated the rules that HHS implemented regarding
the IDR process found in the No Surprises Act.286 The court held that
the rules promulgated by HHS instruct the arbiters of the IDR process to rely too heavily on the qualified payment amount (QPA) as the
factor when deciding payment disputes between providers and insurers when that was not the intent of the No Surprises Act.287 The court
definitively held that the “[r]ule places its thumb on the scale for the
QPA.”288 Although this ruling only vacates certain rules that HHS set
forth and does not impact the actual language of the No Surprises Act,
this decision nevertheless reinforces the power that lobbying groups
currently have and will likely continue to possess to challenge the No
Surprises Act in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unifying principle regarding balance billing regulations has
been that “consumers should not be liable for surprise medical bills in
circumstances where they have little or no control over whether their
medical providers are in-network.”289 The No Surprises Act does just
that. It fully protects beneficiaries regardless of the type of insurance
they have, and in nearly all situations, it prohibits providers from
sending balance bills in addition to holding the beneficiaries harmless.290 Furthermore, it fills the crucial gaps in federal balance billing
legislation that the Consumer Protections Medical Bills Act and the
Ban Surprise Billing Act missed. Unlike the Consumer Protections
Medical Bills Act, the No Surprises Act restricts balance billing from
air ambulance providers, and unlike the Ban Surprise Billing Act, the
285. TEX. MED. ASS’N, TMA Welcomes U.S. District Court Decision to Grant Its Summary
Judgment Motion (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=58782; Joey Berlin,
TMA Win on Surprise-Billing Rule Also a Win for Access to Care, TEX. MED. ASS’N (Mar. 31,
2022), https://www.texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=58801.
286. Tex. Med. Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. Health & Hum. Servs., No. 6:21-cv-425-JDK, 2022 WL
542879, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2022).
287. Id. at *8; Berlin, supra note 285.
288. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 2022 WL 542879, at *8.
289. Hoadley, supra note 54, at 6.
290. H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 102(b) (2020); Press Release, House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, supra note 239.
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No Surprises Act more thoroughly protects beneficiaries seeking
emergency care and those belonging to self-insured plans.291 Despite
the recent litigation in Texas, the No Surprises Act possesses a promising dispute resolution process to resolve payment issues as well.292 In
fact, if the dispute resolution process does not work as expected, Congress can still turn to a benchmark payment standard since it already
has the framework for one from state legislation as well as the Ban
Surprise Billing Act.293 Therefore, by passing the No Surprises Act,
hospitals will be able to more definitively act as neighbors within the
community as well as maintain a positive reputation that will keep
patients healthy and trusting of the medical providers that they seek
out.294 In doing so, providers will be properly compensated for their
work, and patients will receive the treatment they deserve.
Georgie Bierwirth

291. See supra Part III.A-C.
292. H.R. 133 § 103(a)(c)(1)(B).
293. H.R. 5800, 116th Cong. (2020); Hoadley, supra note 54, at 5.
294. Stephen Walston, A Policy Analysis of Balance Billing Legislation in Washington State,
UNIV. WASH. 16 (2020), https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/
46049/Walston_washington_0250O_21154.pdf).
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